In most cases, the emergence of extremist groups starts with a logic idea, which then may mutate to criminal and terror organizations that ends up threatening the same people and principles that should be protected. When the Taliban emerged, it positioned itself as a nationalist formation that was geared toward protecting the political and territorial integrity of Afghanistan. The campaign by the group was not about tribal or religious affiliation per se, but winning against an invasion that had threatened the very core of the Afghan nation. As such, the group joined with other militants fighting to guard Afghan sovereignty. However, overtime that promise was overlooked and the group found itself fighting more of a religious battle than for a political option (Haqqani, 2013). That imposed extreme measures to the country’s population, especially those who were not from the Sunni Islam sect. It became more entangled on regional issues and interests in sponsoring conflicts in other parts of the region, drawing it away from the original course of guarding its boarders.

In that aspect, the question has always remained whether or not the true intensions of the Taliban has been overlooked, or the organization just forgot about its objectives. The transformation of the organization has clearly showed a quite different picture from what it had presented during its formation period. In fact, those changes have seen the organization not only lose some of its former allies, but become bitter foes, especially with the United States (Armajani, 2012). Therefore, it is a quite huge task to understand the real interests of a terror group, such as the Taliban, and whether or not the affinity they have for war will ever come to an end. As such, the Taliban has proved itself as an unreliable partner in seeking global peace and freedom for the oppressed nations and groups (Gopal, 2014). Hence, it is significant to prepare concrete plans aimed at battling the similar organization on a global scale.

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History

The origin of the emergence of terror groups is not always understood at the beginning, and different people will identify the organization differently, depending on whether or not they share the same interests. It was the case with the formation of the Taliban, which came to existence at the pick of the Cold war era in 1979. At its early stages, the western world nations led by the Americans considered the Taliban as a group of people focused on fighting for self-determination from the Soviet Union invasion.

On the other hand, the Soviets viewed the group as resistant movements. In 1973, under the disguise of helping rebuild Afghanistan, the Soviet Union sent troops to the country. The following act was considered an aggression considering the expansionist mentality of the power at the time (Ansary, 2012). As a result, the Afghan leadership was forced to seek assistance from other countries opposed to the Soviet domination to provide necessary support in the campaign against the aggressor. The regional contributing nations that viewed the Soviets with similar mistrust and sided with the Afghans were Saudi Arabia and Pakistan (Giustozzi, 2012). On the global front, the United States took this as an opportunity to stop the expansion of Soviet control over other nations, hence using the new rebellion as a proxy to destroy its archrival’s regional and global influence.

In those early days, the Taliban was known by a different name as Afghan Mujahedeen, to who the Americans, the Saudis, and the Pakistanis provided financial and military support to end the soviet occupation. When the Soviets left in 1989, the Mujahedeen’s immediately failed to reach an arrangement to form a government, resulting in a conflict among the group members (Barfield, 2012). It was not until 1994, when the Taliban emerged as the most powerful after the support of Pakistan. However, it was not until 1999 when the United Nations (UN) linked the Taliban government directly to terror that most nations began to consider it a sponsor of terrorism, as well as an extremist organization (Moreau, 2013). The decision was based on the Taliban regime support for Osama bin Laden’s activities that involved training jihadists and attacking civilians.

After the UN’s two resolutions, UNSCR 1267 of 1999 and 1333 of 2000, the American government with the support of the NATO launched an attack on the Taliban administration, blaming it for the 2001 September 11, attacks. The terrorist acts contributed to the loss of life and property in the U.S., which the Americans laid the culpability on Osama bin Laden, the AL Qaeda leader, whom they believed to have lived in Afghanistan at the time under the protection of the Taliban government (Ansary, 2012). Since the eviction from the major cities in Afghanistan as well as government control, the Taliban has retreated to villages and in some instances have had control along the border with Pakistan, and sometimes even inside the country.

The group has resulted in insurgency, and has as well applied a sporadic attack formula while confronting its enemies. As such, there is no determined battle ground for the two sides, and neither does the Taliban have identifiable insignia or offices that could lead to their identification (Barfield, 2012). In that sense, the forces fighting the organization have no way of establishing the real members of the group unless they attack or identify themselves as so. The nature of the Taliban has mutated from a well-organized militia, to a governmental organization, and then falling to insurgency where it rests at the moment (Soherwordi, Ashraf, & Khattak, 2012). Under all these circumstances, the terror organization had identifiable belligerents with who they resulted in huge confrontation, and were also of an international phenomenon.

Reasons for the Emergence of the Taliban

As noted in its history, the origins of the Taliban are based on several factors by various groups involved that were factored together to seeing the Taliban’s establishment. As such, these reasons can be classified into two: internal and external. The internal factors are those precipitated by the needs and interests of the country’s citizens. In the 1970s and 1980s, the military might of the Soviet Union, one of the world’s superpower at the time, was growing, and the Soviets did not hide their quest for expansion (Ansary, 2012). To mitigate the threat, the Afghans opted to forge a common resistance militia to defeat the invasion. That measure became the major reason for the emergence and public support of the Mujahedeen fighters who later came to be known as the Taliban. The need to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country was paramount to the formation of the organization (Barfield, 2012). As such, during that period, it was not widely regarded as a terror group, but a militia fighting organization for independence. Thus, the Taliban was considered as heroes at some point during its emergence.

Another reason for the rise of the group, though not seemingly as important, was the protection of the religious freedoms. By comparing the social setup between the Soviets and the Afghanis, it was evident that the former were predominantly the Christians, while the latter were the Muslims (Armajani, 2012). As such, Muslim groups felt threatened by possible domination by the Christian rule, which would deprive them of religious freedoms. Therefore, the people opted to create a militia to resist any form of religious, cultural, political or social destabilization that was likely to occur (Ansary, 2012). These forces were meant to supplement the government of the Afghanistan forces in pushing back the Soviet invasion.

Additionally, for the internal reason of the terror group, regional political pundits have also argued it could have resulted from the voluntary emergence of indigenous Pashtuns who were growing weary of the violent tactics applied on the by mujahedeen groups that dominated in the area (Barfield, 2012). As such, the origin of the Taliban has, in some ways, been regarded as a battle for freedom by villagers to send away various criminal organizations that encroached their regions, subjecting the residents to severe life conditions though extreme religious and political ideologies that deprived most of the residents of peace. According to Mullah Omar, a onetime the Taliban supreme leader, the Taliban organization was in a battle against the bandits who engaged in lawless acts, such as murder or rape (Davis, Larson, Haldeman, Oguz, & Rana, 2012). The villagers felt that the government did not do enough to protect them, and thus there was a need to pick up arms to fight for their beliefs and freedoms (Gopal, 2014). At the beginning, the formation of the militia was not so strong. However, it did not enroll outsiders, and different villages were required to raise an army of its own, before joining hands with other groups to create a regional or national force with common interests, and which was ready to offer protection.

On the other hand, the external reasons that contributed to the emergence of the Taliban were not from inside the Afghanistan, but from the external forces. It is recognizable that during the Cold war there were two major superpowers who competed for power, influence, and domination of the world’s affairs. As such, the Americans being on the opposing side with the Soviets, it became significant for them to promote the creation of mujahedeen forces, as a way of countering the growing expansion of their rival (Gall, 2015). Therefore, it could be explained that a major reason for the Taliban formation was to limit the regional as well as international influence by the Soviet Union.

Again, as to the external factors, it is also necessary to note that regional countries, such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, also acted to create and enhance the capabilities of the group. While they had a common enemy as the Afghans and the Americans, their reason for the support was quite different. The two countries and others in the region got nervous of the risk posed by the Soviets to their sovereignty. Thus, their interest was never to protect the independence of Afghanistan from the Soviets, but to have the former act as a buffer zone that would reduce the chances of the Soviet aggression ever reaching them.

Under the conviction that they were bestowed with the authority to rule over the Islamic world, the Saudis did everything possible to wrestle the control of Afghanistan from the Soviets and hand it over to the Islamic power they regarded as friendly to them. That strategy became more evident when the Soviets were defeated, and the Taliban declared a supporter of terror in later years (Davis, Larson, Haldeman, Oguz, & Rana, 2012). During that period, the majority of the world failed to give the Taliban political recognition as a legitimate government of Afghanistan, leaving only Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the U.A.E as their allies. In that sense, it may be concluded that the origin of the group from a Saudi perspective was Saudi interests and neither Afghanis' nor Taliban’s.

In regard to American support and creation of the group, a different reason from that of the Saudi government could be identified. During the years of the Taliban conflict with the Soviets, the world was bipolar in terms of determining the superpower. The growing mistrusts between the two global leaders forced the two nations to develop weapons that they would not use on each other due to the catastrophic damage it would have to all (Giustozzi, 2012). As such, the United States and the Soviet Union avoided conventional wars and only participated in the Cold war. That meant they could use wars that they were not involved in to showcase their military prowess in an aim of defeating the others (Davis, Larson, Haldeman, Oguz, & Rana, 2012). In that regard, the Soviets fought in Afghanistan to force the country to become part of them, hence increasing their sphere of influence. On the other hand, the Americans were determined to stop Soviets power from growing and thus provided the Taliban with logistical, training, and weaponry support through Saudi Arabia to ensure their objective was achieved (Haqqani, 2013). Under that lens, the origin of the Taliban could be regarded as having an international outlook and be defined as a competition for domination.

From Pakistan's perspective, another theory of trade interest could be provided. In the earlier days before the creation of the Taliban, trade between Pakistan and the Central Asia countries was highly limited owing to the challenges posed by the continued growth of other mujahedeen forces in the region (Gopal, 2014). That increasingly compromised Pakistan’s economic and commercial interests as it blocked the routes connecting the regions. As such, since Pakistan could not directly enter into a conflict, it began to raise a militia within Afghanistan with the hopes of influencing them to protect their trade interests in exchange for power. As a result, as the group grew powerful, it slowly became independent from its former masters in Pakistan, developing its own interests and objectives that it sought to fulfil (Johnson, 2011). However, were it not for the political and military support it was receiving from Pakistan, it would not have become that powerful.

Most Important Operations by the Taliban

The most significant operations by the Taliban has involved fighting other organizations that seek to dominate them. In that regard, the terror group participated and engaged in several battles that it used as a benchmark to prove its power and ability to tackle anything that it considered a threat to it.

At present, the Taliban group can boast of four major severe wars that has engaged with global powers, or at least forces considered to be so strong and lethal (Moreau, 2013). The belligerents with whom the Taliban had to fight with includes the Soviet Union, which was considered a superpower by then.

The other significant war the group had to engage with is the battle for control of Afghanistan in the early 1990s, or what could be regarded as the battle to take control of the government. The war was largely internal but was supported by some external quarters on both sides of the divide (Soherwordi, Ashraf, & Khattak, 2012).

The third war relates to the conflict with the United States, which began in 2001 and has lasted for more than 16 years up to the present times.

The fourth and final significant battle was against control and domination by the Islamic States (ISIS). Although both are considered as terror groups, ISIS has been considered to have more financial resources in comparison to the Taliban. Moreover, it has had better military equipment that could enable the group to contest powerful armies while compared to the Taliban (Rashid, 2010). In fact, the ISIS group is considered to have become too strong to threaten the established governments, such as in Syria and to some extent Iraq. In that sense, the confrontation between the ISIS and the Taliban has ended with the former retreating, thus making the latter appear more powerful than ever.

Taliban Operations against the Soviet Forces

The Taliban confrontation with the Soviets began as early as in 1979 when the Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan with the core purpose of annexing the country to become part of its union, hence losing sovereignty. Determined to defeat what they viewed as domination attempts by the superpower, the groups of the Afghanis began to assemble with the aim of putting forward a strong resistance against the invader. The small groups of what came to be known as the Taliban already existed in the eastern parts of the country, near the Pakistani boarders, and were willing to join other mujahedeen groups to defeat the Soviet aggression (Rashid, 2010). During the conflict, the then Afghan government forces joined the USSR and attacked the resistance movements.

In the times when the Taliban entered the war, it viewed it as an expression of self-determination to defeat supremacy by a foreign power and as betrayal by own government. As such, since there was no hope to accept the opposing side’s wishes, the group organized to fight and defeat the alliance.

In that war, several external factors came into play with several powers supporting mujahedeen forces against the Soviets which they viewed as significant to limiting the latter’s power and expansion. As such, the Taliban and the support groups got the best logistical information from the Americans, while the Saudis and the Pakistanis provided them with weapons and financial support. The success of the war was thus considered significant for the Taliban (Rashid, 2010). The forces fighting alongside the group had a military strength of close to 250,000 soldiers, while those fighting on the Soviets side were about 650,000. The war lasted for ten years from 1979 to 1989, with the win of the mujahedeen groups (Ansary, 2012). Although it became so tiring and expensive, the defeat of the Soviets was also precipitated by internal problems it was experiencing within its own union, which was collapsing at the time (Johnson, 2011). Nevertheless, the feeling that the mujahedeen forces, which the Taliban was part of, kept a world superpower at bay for ten years, it was a big enough win, in addition to the final success, which proved the strength of the group.

Battle for Government Control

By the time the Afghanistan-Soviet Union came to an end, there had been no well-established governance, and the mujahedeen forces had united to form an authority for the country in the early 1990s. However, the unity was only short-lived, and by 1994, a full-scale civil war had involved the whole country. The war engaged the government militaries and the other groups that helped fight the Soviet aggression (Johnson, 2011). At that time, no clear government was visible in Afghanistan, and thus the civil war threatened to tear down the entire country. By 1994, the Taliban forces had been able to access support by the Pakistan government agencies and in particular the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) (Ansary, 2012). As such, the group had an added advantage over its enemies as it would easily tell whom to attack, when and how.

The core concern for the Pakistanis was to ensure that a favorable rule to the interests of their country was established in Afghanistan (Barfield, 2012). As such, they were not willing to back down on their plan, especially having established a reliable friendship that they had considered strong enough to take over the leadership of the country. Besides, during that period, the Taliban had its membership increase tremendously as the recruits from Pakistan as well as refugees streamed back to the country to join the movement. In fact most of these members studied madrassas in Pakistan where they were taught the extremist ideologies that were upheld by the Taliban (O'Donnell, 2016). As a result, equipped with intelligence, indoctrination, increasing membership, and weapons, the Taliban was finally able to take control of the country’s leadership at around 1996. However, the group was only recognized by three governments worldwide, including those of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan (Giustozzi, 2012). There also remained remnants of the groups that resisted the Taliban rule.

American War on Terror in Afghanistan and Taliban Resistance

Although the United States did not openly contend Taliban activities in the early 1990s, the U.S. government was no longer interested in seeing the Taliban forces rise to power in Afghanistan. On several occasions, the Taliban and its supporters were accused of sponsoring terrorism both within Afghanistan as well as in the region, such as in Chechnya, a Russian territory that seeks independence (Armajani, 2012). Such activities as well as many others led to the introduction of the United Nations Security Council resolutions, UNSCR 1267 of 1999 and 1333 of 2000, condemning sponsoring of terror-related activities by the Taliban regime that controlled a substantial part of Afghanistan and was seen as the government in the country; though it was not recognized by most U.N. member states (Gopal, 2014).

Although no other significant actions were taken then, after the 9/11 terror attacks on the New York’s twin towers of the World trade Center, the American government sent the military to Afghanistan with the aims of toppling the regime and instituting a democratic government that would be under their control and would respect human rights. The Americans wanted to install an administration that they hoped would cut the Afghan ties with terror organizations, such as al-Qaida (Rashid, 2013). As it turned out, it has become difficult for the Americans to fully achieve the set goals as the Taliban forces have become difficult to defeat based on their model of operation, which is insurgency. As such, no one knows where, who, when and how they will attack (Giustozzi, 2012). Although the American/NATO presence in Afghanistan has inflicted heavy casualties on the Taliban, the number of the foreign soldiers who died during the operation is also quite high.

Although the Taliban organization does not hold the government realms today, it still controls some regions of the country. The central government still remains weak that it would most probably fall when all the foreign troops are withdrawn from the country (O'Donnell, 2016). The Taliban do have massive support, especially in the villages, which has become an added advantage to the group. Due to such reasons, the group has been able to resist the war for the past 16 years, making the war the longest continuous war in the history of America. Although the Obama Administration had suggested withdrawing the American troops, sporadic attacks by the Taliban group has made it a problem for the troops to leave (Rashid, 2013). The American troops are not leaving because their job is completely done, but because it becomes impossible to fight with an enemy who does not engage in conventional wars, but prefers the tactic of insurgency.

Taliban Confrontation with ISIS

The confrontation with the Islamic States terror group is the last major conflict that the Taliban has had to endure. It is not always the case that a group considered to be too extreme and claiming to follow strict Islamic would feel perplexed by the emergence of another. However, the magnitude of the violence by the ISIS was too extreme that even the Taliban was uneasy to join it, yet it seemed that both groups had a common enemy (Pillalamarri, 2016). The ambition of the Taliban was to have the Islamic emirates within Afghanistan, while the ISIS largely concentrated on establishing an Islamic caliphate covering the Middle East and the North Africa region. Maybe, due to the above reason, the Taliban felt uneasy considering that their wars are inspired by self-determination to free the citizens of Afghanistan from outside control (Azami, 2015). The Taliban has an ethnic and nationalistic based creed as opposed to the universal Islamic doctrine propagated by the ISIS.

Major differences put both groups on a collision course since the 2014 when the ISIS forces displayed too much power that was considered a threat to regional and international stability (Azami, 2015). Although Taliban has widely been known for extremism before, the group rarely had the kind of financial muscle, and connections shown by the ISIS due to to the instability in the Middle East, following the Arab Spring and the Iraq crisis. The insurgency between the two groups have seen them capture and murder opponents, with the Taliban’s main aim being to get the ISIS element out of Afghanistan (Pillalamarri, 2016). With numerous number of groups joining hands to fight the Islamic States, the battle is slowly being won. The Taliban has successfully liberated most of the areas previously controlled by the ISIS. Although the battle is still far from over, the gains made cannot be under estimated (Azami, 2015). However, it is also significant to recognize that the Taliban successes in this confrontation was hugely due to the efforts of other groups fighting the ISIS from different fronts, such as the NATO, the USA, Russia, Iran, and the Middle East governments (Yousafzai, 2015). The lethal extreme nature of the Taliban still remains as an extra-potential threat to the stability of the Middle East, and the world in general, considering its continued support of terrorism against regional governments and foreign citizens.

The Reality of the Taliban at the Moment

The fight against Taliban movement has taken a turn that was not so much expected. In the early days of its formation, the group acted and operated as a well-organized militia and had a clearly established leadership command (Johnson, 2011). As such, it was a government formation that was still not in power, especially at the times it was fighting against the Soviets invasion. Besides, during that period, its structural formation allowed for proper negotiations and interactions with other parties (Gopal, 2014). After the Soviets had left, the group scrabble for power until 1996 when it formed the government, forcing it to establish proper command and leadership structures, though still based on village units (Davis, Larson, Haldeman, Oguz, & Rana, 2012). It should be noted that after the 2001 NATO invasion, the Taliban metamorphosed to its current status of being an insurgency group.

At present, it has become extremely difficult to track Taliban fighters, especially in the villages, considering that they have no uniforms or insignias to identify them (Rashid, 2013). In most cases, the followers of the group have appeared like normal citizens going about their daily businesses, only to re-emerge at night with weapons to attack those they consider as their enemies (Rashid, 2010). As such, despite having lost the control of the Afghani government, the group has still been ruling an underhand way by instilling fear to those who reside in the villages. In fact, it has been recognized as having control over the largest parts of Afghanistan as compared to all other groups fighting in the country. Yet, despite these praises, the Taliban has not appeared as a governing organization for the country.

Although seemingly as not having political control, the Taliban leadership structure has always given it a wedge above all other groups it has sought to compete with. For them, it is not just about winning in the military battle fields, but also gaining mental allegiance (Armajani, 2012). As such, it has concentrated on teaching its followers the group’s ideologies since their tender age make them grow under the illusion of the extreme views. In that sense, people pay loyalty to the group, not just because they feel threatened, but because they have been made to believe that it is the only form of legitimate authority that fights for their rights and freedom, particularly from the outside domination.

The Taliban political structure is interrelated with the local leadership at the villages, as well as with the Islamic law. As such, it has established a strong foundation and political base that rivals the national government at Kabul, or the regional governments. In fact, the authority and control of the Taliban has been seen to expand even to the neighboring Pakistan (Rashid, 2013). Therefore, the model of leadership is significant particularly for the remote parts of the country as it engages people directly, from both the political as well as military perspective (Johnson, 2011). The communities do not feel so much threatened as they do not view the group as an invader, but as a freedom fighter, especially when the eternal forces become involved.

In another development, the most difficult war to fight is one where the attacker is invisible. The Taliban organization is a huge and expanded group. However, its structure makes it hard to identify the members without discriminating against the villagers (Giustozzi, 2012). The group uses an attack strategy where it hits the enemy and immediately retreats to hiding, making it difficult to retaliate (Soherwordi, Ashraf, & Khattak, 2012). In addition, due to its intertwined nature with the surrounding noncombatant community, it has always been regarded as using civilian targets as shields to prevent an attack on them. The fact that even within the society they can be rarely identified makes it hard for an individual target.

Moreover, the Taliban mainly uses small weapons that are at times difficult to track. Although the group members do have few tracks and battle tanks, those living within the societies relies on guns and small explosive devices, which would be difficult to trace, but will inflict a maximum damage (Gall, 2015). Besides, the group has at times showed the signs of weaknesses and tried to forge open ties with the al-Qaida. In the early periods of its formation and when it held the whims of governance in Afghanistan, the Taliban presented itself as an honorable organization that did not sponsor terror activities across the region, and at times internationally (Soherwordi, Ashraf, & Khattak, 2012). However, since it was forced out of the government by the NATO forces, it has worked towards enhancing a relationship with other groups categorized as Islamic extremists (Rashid, 2013). Although such a relationship was always known to have existed, the group has not exposed itself so openly in the public.

Analyzing this behavior, one may conclude that the invasion by the NATO forces has thrown the group into disarray. Thus, it has resulted in desperate tactics, which includes joining hands with other groups to boost its strength and operations, as well as instill fear amongst its enemies. The once strong organization saw its strength in terms of military capacity fade away, hence leaving it with an option of operating like bandits. That means the Taliban members attack and run away since they cannot sustain a constant war in the battlefield. Moreover, the group has lost most of its revenues following removal from the government as well as the subsequent denial by former allies, such as the UAE, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, who consequently stopped funding it since the American led attack in 2001 (Barfield, 2012). Similarly, it has also lost credibility and political support from different governmental organizations as it now ranks as a terror organization, which threatens international peace (Ansary, 2012). Therefore, no government or legitimate business or organization wants to be seen as having forged ties with the group at the moment.

Successful and Unsuccessful Solutions to Marginalize the Taliban

Successful Solutions to Marginalize the Taliban

Since the NATO invasion of Afghanistan, there have been many techniques applied by these forces to guarantee the collapse of the Taliban. At first, the Americans and the allied forces ensured they labeled the Taliban a terror organization through the United Nations, to break any possible interaction of the group with the global governments. The step was significant to break political support of the terror group from the global governments (O'Donnell, 2016). That measure made sure that no open support was to be accorded to the group whether by the politicians or the media. In that sense, the only narrative getting to the public globally was demonizing the Taliban. Soon after, people began to develop cold feet against the movement, which made it easier for the NATO and the American government to attack with little public outcry against the war (Moreau, 2013). On the other hand, regional governments, such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Pakistani, who previously supported the Taliban, were forced to choose a side, where they opted to abandon the movement.

Secondly, successful approach to weaken the Taliban entailed cutting all its financial sources. The achievement of this goal involved several techniques. To begin with, the United Nations Security Council resolutions designating the Taliban as a supporter of terror was also meant to ensure no trade activities were conducted with the group. As such, there was total sanctioning of its members and supporters, denying them travel and businesses activities that would give them financial resources (Giustozzi, 2012). The approach has to a greater extent succeeded in drying off the group’s source of finances, thus denying it the ability to pay its fighters as well as offer them food and other basic commodities. The above measure has increasingly reduced the loyalty of many people and organizations to the Taliban for the fear of being reprimanded.

Thirdly, the forces acting against the Taliban movement orchestrated it removal from the whims of power to tarnish its international reputation. It is always the case that a government of any form will have some allies globally who cooperate with it and conduct business together. However, after its removal from power, most governments tend to side with the new authority with the hope that they will secure not only their business opportunities but also their investments (Gall, 2015). That step leads to the isolation of the previous authority, hence denying it an opportunity to express itself, and relate with governments as it will have nothing to offer. As such, many governments do not wish to channel funds to a conflict where they will not have their money refunded (Davis, Larson, Haldeman, Oguz, & Rana, 2012).

Fourthly, another way of ensuring isolation is to deny the group of resources through which it could entice the members of the public to join it. When the Americans and their allies invaded Afghanistan, they ensured that most supply lines and sources of finance for the Taliban were cut (Gall, 2015). As a result, the terror organization had no money to buy weapons as well as feed its members and supporters. As such, not so many people were willing to join an organization that could rarely sustain itself.

Unsuccessful Solutions to Marginalize the Taliban

When attacks against the group began, media campaign across the world started portraying the Taliban as an extremist organization that oppressed its people and supported terror globally (Rashid, 2010). While this script was bought by the public outside the Middle East, in the region the American forces and their allies remained largely viewed as the aggressors. As such, the media crusade was not as successful, as the Afghanis, particularly the villagers, did not fully reject the organization (O'Donnell, 2016). Thus, the Taliban got the opportunity to operate on the ground without being reported by the locals.

The international community attempts to introduce a democratic government in Afghanistan have been men with a lot of resistance from the locals. In fact, the former President, Hamid Karzai, had his government rejected as it was largely seen as a puppet in the hands of the Western World countries. The government was suggested to hold talks with the Taliban to convince its representatives of the need to build peace for the country (Barfield, 2012). Such an option is guided by the fact that the Taliban has got a huge sway over the opinion of the people, especially in the villages. Engaging them and sharing government positions with them would remove the perception of a western sponsored regime and mak it look more local in the eyes of the Afghanis (Soherwordi, Ashraf, & Khattak, 2012). In addition, it would also reduce the pressure on the government from the citizen opposition, thus creating a ground for cooperation and acceptance.

Lessons Learned

The Taliban case study is a clear reflection of how terror organizations emerge, metamorphose, and grow to become a danger both to local and international community. As such, several lessons can be drawn from the analysis. Firstly, governments around the globe should avoid forming different alliances with non-governmental militias, which they do not have full control of. For example, almost all of the supporters of the Taliban at its inception have become the enemy and the target of the group and do not know how to control the movement anymore.

Secondly, a full invasion of a country should never be conducted without a clear strategy of how the crisis could be resolved. The environment through which terror groups, such as the Taliban, thrive is largely unstable. Thus, the creation of weak governments and unstable nations is a recipe for the emergence of resistance movements.

Thirdly, where the country’s population seems to sympathize with resistance or support an extremist movement, then negotiations should take a center stage as a way of guaranteeing full support to the government.

Fourthly, in the case of the Middle East, the outsiders from the region should allow the intervention process to be conducted by the regional players to eliminate the perception of foreign domination.

Last but not least, people will fight inspired by different reasons that could be either correct or wrong. However, the beginning of a victory for a war will always begin with mental conviction of the need for a war and not domination or dictatorship. In fact, oppression is always regarded as the source of resistance movements in any country that could then lead to changes, depending on the environment of the group. As such, a movement that started off with good intentions could end up becoming a danger to the people it sought to protect.